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The Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial
White-Collar Crime
Andrew Spalding*
INTRODUCTION

Recent reports of egregious labor practices in China and
Bangladesh have called public attention to the potential harms of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. The best,
or at least most obvious, tool for reducing destructive overseas
business practices would seem to be the extraterritorial
application of white-collar criminal law. i The "holy grail" of
contemporary criminal law is deterrence, 2 and the deterrence
literature is largely shaped by the paradigm of law and
economics. Prominent within that literature is Polinsky and
Shavell's "enforcement authority," which seeks to maximize
social utility through the efficient deterrence of crime.a Guided by
the principles of law and economics, the enforcement authority
wields four enforcement tools: enforcement expenditures, the
level of the fine, the length of imprisonment, and the standard for
imposing liability. 4 By manipulating these variables, it can
presumably achieve the optimal combination of minimizing crime
while also minimizing public expense.5
But this essay argues that, in international business law
specifically, that enforcement authority will tend to fail. The
traditional methods of criminal deterrence, when applied
rigorously and in good faith, will ultimately create the very
conditions in which extraterritorial white-collar crime
proliferates. As the enforcement authority utilizes its tools to

• Associate Professor, the University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to
thank the many colleagues at UR and beyond who provided feedback on this draft, but in
particular Jordan Barry, Chris Buccafusco, and Jim Gibson. I would also like to thank my
excellent research assistant, Amanda Cottingham.
1 See, e.g., Jodie Gummow, In Bangladesh, Workers Escalate Demands for Better
Working Conditions, TRUTHOUT (May 26, 2013, 9:52), http://www.truth-out.org/
news/item/16594-in-bangladesh-workers-escalate-demands-for-better-working-conditions.
2 Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 515 (2006).
3 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 72 (2000).
4 Id. at 49.
5 See id. at 70.
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pursue the optimally low level of such crime, unique legal and
economic conditions will too often produce an increase in overall
rates of criminality. Deterrence's goal-namely, the reduction in
crime-can only be achieved by utilizing tools and theories that
are not part of the contemporary deterrence logic.
Section I briefly describes the law and economics approach to
deterrence, and explains why scholars have not been particularly
concerned with whether deterrence could lead to an increase,
rather than a decrease, in crime. Section II then explains how
international business, particularly foreign direct investment in
developing countries, creates a set of conditions in which this
possibility arises. It constructs a model, using bribery
prohibitions as an example, which illustrates that beyond a given
level of enforcement, heightened enforcement will produce a net
increase in crime in the host country. Section III explores the
possibility that corporate social responsibility (CSR) may be able
to pick up where law and economics leaves off. That is, though
crime reduction ultimately proves beyond the reach of the law
and economics enforcement authority, it may be within the reach
of socially responsible corporations. But inducing these
corporations to more than mere compliance requires a
reexamination of the basic assumptions on the relationship
between CSR and globalization.

I. THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE
This section briefly discusses both the theoretical and
empirical scholarship on how deterrence works. It then shows
how little attention deterrence scholars have paid to the problem
of overdeterrence.

A.

The Downside of Deterrence's Upside
Within the law and economics scholarship, the watershed
work on public law enforcement was Polinsky and Shavell's The
Economic Theory of the Public Enforcement of Law.6 They explain
that to the law and economics way of thinking, "social welfare
generally is presumed to equal the sum of individuals' expected
utilities."7 An individual's expected utility essentially depends on
four variables: whether she commits a harmful act, whether she
is sanctioned (by fine, imprisonment, or both), whether she is a
victim of someone else's harmful act, and on her tax payment

6
1

See generally id.
Id. at 48.
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(which will reflect the costs of law enforcement, less any fine
revenue collected).s
The individual thus wears two hats in the utility calculation:
as potential wrongdoer, and as potential victim. The potential
victim's two variables-whether she is a victim, and the extent of
her taxes-are of course closely interconnected. Recognizing her
potential victimization, she pays taxes to prevent it. The purpose
of paying taxes, then, is to prevent the disutility of victimization.
The paradigm thus assumes that we pay taxes to increase our
individual utility; were there no threat of victimization, the
individual would have no reason to pay taxes. There would be no
utility in it; not faced with the threatened disutility of falling
victim, her utility would not be maximized by paying taxes to
finance public criminal law enforcement. The potential victims
are taxpayers; the taxpayers are potential victims.
The "enforcement authority's problem" then is to maximize
social welfare by finding the most efficient combination of the
four key enforcement variables mentioned above: enforcement
expenditures, the level of the fine, the length of imprisonment,
and the standard for imposing liability.9 The disutility of crime is
weighed against the cost of prevention, and the aim is to reduce
crime with maximal cost-efficiency. The enforcement authority
should expend only so much on enforcement as is necessary to
reduce the disutility for the taxpayer.
Following Beccaria's admonition that "[i]t is better to
prevent crimes than to punish them,"10 law and economics seeks
to deter crime by ensuring that the cost of punishment to a
potential wrongdoer exceeds the rewards.11 The core assumption
of deterrence is that potential wrongdoers will decide against the
commission of a criminal act based on the fear of sanctions or
punishment. 12 It assumes that the potential (and perhaps
hypothetical) wrongdoer calculates the utility of crime based on
the benefits and costs of the criminal act as well as the benefits
and costs of abstaining.13 The attributes of punishment that can
be manipulated to maintain the proper cost-benefit ratio are its
certainty, severity, and celerity (or swiftness). 14 If set
s Id.
9 Id. at 49.
10 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 93 (Henry Paolucci trans., 6th
prtg. 1977) (1764).
11 GEORGE B. VOLD, THOMAS J. BERNARD & JEFFREY B. SNIPES, THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 196 (5th ed. 2002).
12 Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010).
13
14

Id.
Id. at 783.
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appropriately, the potential violator will succumb to deterrence
because a rational choice would never result in the commission of
a crime; the cost would prove too high in comparison to the
perceived benefit. 15 Thus, "[p]unishment is said to have a
deterrent effect when the fear or actual imposition of punishment
leads to conformity."16
This core theory has given rise to a number of hypotheses
that empiricists continue to test. Questions remain concerning to
what extent an increase in the objective costs of punishment to a
potential wrongdoer, particularly length of sentence, will
decrease the incidence of crime; to what extent increasing
enforcement resources will increase certainty and celerity;
whether objective increases in certainty, severity, or celerity will
produce a proportional increase in the subjective perceptions of
those attributes among wrongdoers and therefore exert a
downward push on crime; etc.17
But note that these are questions of degree. While we do not
know whether deterrence "works very well,"1s we know it works.
The empirical evidence indeed demonstrates that deterrence
measures succeed-however imperfectly-in reducing crime. 19
Actors subject to the jurisdiction of a law that penalizes a given
form of conduct with the requisite degree of certainty, severity,
and celerity will engage in less of that conduct. We know this,
and we might call it the upside of deterrence.
But notice the corollary. If we know that actors subject to a
criminal prohibition will engage in less of that conduct, we also
know that actors not so subject will engage in more of it. Applied
to white-collar enforcement, companies subject to the criminal
prohibition on a particular form of profitable but socially
undesirable conduct will engage in less of that conduct than
companies that are not so subject; companies not subject to that
prohibition will engage, relatively speaking, in more of that
conduct. This is the downside of deterrence's upside. To clarify,
what I am here calling the downside is not a consequence of its
upside; it is merely a logical corollary that will prove important
in the analysis below. And in international business, governed by
the extraterritorial application of criminal laws, where the law's

15 See VOLD ET AL., supra note 11, at 196.
16 TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG LU, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 20 (2005). Deterrence need not be complete; partial deterrence is still
successful. Id. at 21.
17 See Paternoster, supra note 12, at 787-818.
18 Id. at 766; see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION:
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 9 (2009).
19 KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 10-11.
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stated object is to deter overseas crime, the downside proves to be
a tricky problem.

B.

The Nonissue of Criminal Overdeterrence
Despite the robust theoretical and empirical deterrence
literature, scholars have given little attention to the issue of
criminal overdeterrence. In civil law, by contrast, the cost of
overdeterrence is well recognized:20 if punishment for causing a
car accident were $1 million, people would likely cease driving.21
But for the kinds of intentional acts generally proscribed by
criminal law, the risk of discouraging socially productive
behavior, or of encouraging constructive behavior, is negligible.
Because the goal is to achieve effective deterrence by setting
punishment at a sufficiently high level to dissuade potential
offenders, the "temptation to impose increasingly harsher
penalties is strong."22 The optimal level of intentional (as opposed
to negligent) criminal conduct, generally speaking, is therefore
zero.
But scholars have, perhaps somewhat indirectly, addressed
the problem of overdeterrence in two ways. These concern the
risk that deterring a particular crime might increase the
incidence of other crimes. The first is the problem of marginal
deterrence: setting equally high penalties for crimes of unequal
severity will tend to encourage the more severe crime. As George
Stigler famously put it, "If the thief has his hand cut off for
taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000."23 Where the
overall level of criminality might be understood as the number of
crimes committed multiplied by their severity, disproportionate
penalties for relatively mild criminal acts will remove the
disincentive to engage in more serious crimes and thus increase
overall levels of criminality.
The second is based on Neal Katyal's research on
substitution. Katyal held that the public enforcement agency
must consider how penalizing a given crime may increase the
appeal of alternative, or substitute, crimes. An increase in the
20 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 213-17 (8th ed. 2011)
(describing the theory of optimal tort damages).
21 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1056 n.100 (2009).
22 Id. at 1055-56. The overdeterrence problem can arise with negligence crimes;
negligent vehicular homicide would raise the same overdeterrence problems as the civil
example above, such that the optimal level of such homicides may be greater than zero.
Id. at 1056 (stating in the civil tort context "the possibility of overdeterrence is a
persistent problem"); see also POSNER, supra note 20.
23 George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527
(1970).
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"price" of one crime may cause potential wrongdoers to substitute
criminal act X with criminal act Y or z.24 Accordingly, though
enforcing the prohibition on X may well deter X, it may also
increase the incidence of Y or z.25 For both of these problems, the
effort to deter a given crime has produced the collateral harm of
an increase in another form of crime.
But for these costs, scholars have not seemed particularly
concerned about the collateral economic harm of deterring
. criminal behavior. But contemporary international white-collar
enforcement may present new challenges to the logic of
deterrence. Despite deterrence's relatively long history,
originating in the eighteenth-century works of Montesquieu,26
Beccaria,21 and Bentham,2s the concept fell out of fashion and
was largely neglected29 until the seminal work of Gary Becker in
the 1960s.3o And owing largely to Cold War ideological divisions,
international business-and particularly the flow of capital from
developed to developing countries-would not increase
significantly until after the collapse of communism. As will be
shown below, this new economic order raises significant
theoretical and practical problems for deterrence.
II. THE CRIMOGENICS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL WHITE-COLLAR
ENFORCEMENT

Extraterritorial conduct of any sort raises formidable law
enforcement challenges: evidence is difficult to collect, foreign
enforcement authorities may not be cooperative or well
resourced, and cultural sensitivities must be navigated. But this
article argues that the challenges of extraterritorial white-collar
Neal Kumar Katya!, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2387 (1997).
The enforcement authority's inclination to inflict an increasingly severe
punishment may be further restrained in two ways. Bronsteen et al., supra note 21, at
1056. First, the enforcement costs must be no greater than is necessary to achieve the
optimal level of deterrence. Id. These costs would take two forms. Id. Most obvious are the
costs of "detecting, trying, and imprisoning a criminal," which are of course substantial.
Id. Under the logic of deterrence they cannot become excessively so, lest the taxpayers'
disutility exceeds the risk of victimization. Id. But additionally, society incurs the
opportunity cost of removing potentially productive individuals from society through
imprisonment, a factor that is (from a narrowly economic perspective) especially
pronounced in white-collar crime. Id. In addition to these social costs, utilitarianism
would value the welfare (though not the rights) of the defendant; he need not suffer any
greater a punishment than is necessary for deterrence purposes. Id. at 1056-57.
26 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Hafner Publ'g Co. 1949) (1748).
27 See BECCARIA, supra note 10, at 58.
28 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J. H. Burns & H. L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789).
29 Paternoster, supra note 12, at 772-73.
30 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
24
25
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deterrence run far deeper. By definition, many or most actors
committing crimes in foreign jurisdictions are not subject to the
same set of disincentives: companies seeking to extract Nigeria's
oil will hail from the United States, the EU, Russia, China, and
elsewhere, and these countries will have substantially different
white-collar crime regimes in place. The United States, for
example, may be able to deter socially destructive behavior
among U.S. companies and other companies subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, but it cannot readily alter the behavior of those
companies that lie beyond its jurisdiction. To the extent that a
country wishes to reduce criminal conduct in overseas locations
where only a portion of all actors is subject to its jurisdiction, this
becomes problematic.
Of course, it may well be true that in certain areas of law the
aim is not to reduce the overall levels of a given sort of
extraterritorial crime. We may wish only to deter the conduct
among our own citizens, perhaps untroubled by the impact our
own deterrence efforts may have on overall levels of criminality
in those foreign locations. But other areas of law, such as
anti-bribery law, prohibit the overseas conduct categorically,
without regard to whether the conduct has any harmful impact
whatsoever on U.S. markets or persons.
This section shows just how problematic that goal will prove
to be. It develops a model that illustrates how, given current and
foreseeable future legal and economic conditions, extraterritorial
deterrence has pronounced crimogenics1 tendencies. That is, in
attempting to reduce crime overseas, wielding the tools of
deterrence will often create the conditions in which the conduct
we seek to deter actually proliferates.
A.

Three Unique Conditions of International Business
Foreign direct investment, particularly in developing
countries, has three inherent characteristics that distinguish it
from the domestic conduct that deterrence scholarship generally
assumes. In combination, they create a kind of perfect storm in
which deterrence will often prove self-defeating.
The first I will call "selective criminalization." A given form
of extraterritorial conduct may well be criminalized by a
particular home jurisdiction: think of express statutory
prohibitions on overseas bribery or monopolistic conduct in the
31 For a discussion of crimogenics in deterrence, see Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst
When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 985-89 (2003); see also KENNEDY, supra note 18, at
54-72.
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United States, and the dedication of substantial resources to
their enforcement. But other countries may fall into either of two
alternative categories: those that do not enforce their
prohibitions, and those that have not enacted such prohibitions.
In other words, among all actors in a given foreign jurisdiction,
the conduct is only selectively criminalized: the criminal
prohibition applies to some of the companies pursuing Nigerian
oil, but not to others. The United States may wish to deter
bribery there, but lacks jurisdiction over many of the actors.
The second characteristic I will call the "discretionary
investment forum." A typical U.S.-based company will be doing
business in the United States. The enforcement authority thus
need not worry whether that company will choose to continue
doing business there (unless, of course, a given criminal
prohibition threatens to drive a company out of business
altogether, but this is rare and probably confined to highly
dubious business models). But overseas investment forums are
inherently discretionary: a U.S.-based company may choose to
focus its efforts in the United States, or to enter overseas
markets, and if the latter, to focus on the developed or developing
world, and to invest in particular countries. These countries will
vary in their legal, economic, and cultural environments,
potentially creating varying levels of risk that a U.S.-based
company will engage in conduct that its home jurisdiction
criminalizes. Accordingly, the enforcement authority must
consider whether its companies will do business in these
jurisdictions at all. When the enforcement authority uses the
tools of deterrence to raise the costs of a particular behavior, the
costs may rise to a level where, in certain contexts, the risk
becomes too great. Companies may then use their discretion not
to invest in particular projects, sectors, or countries. The effort to
deter crime has thus deterred investment.
Should the enforcement authority care? The question goes to
the very heart of the law and economics methodology. Richard
Posner has characterized law as "a system for maximizing the
wealth of society."32 The aim of enforcement is thus to increase
wealth, for individual persons and for society generally. The
deterrence of investment in foreign countries has implications for
both. Companies may forego relatively efficient investment
opportunities for safer, but less efficient (and profitable)
opportunities. This, in turn, impacts the wealth of both the
capital-exporting and the capital-importing nation: the exporter's
GDP is negatively impacted by the diminished profits of its
32

See POSNER, supra note 20, at 32.
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companies; and the importer's GDP is negatively impacted by the
loss of foreign direct investment. If deterrence is understood as
one of many mechanisms for increasing social wealth, deterring
investment in particular discretionary investment forums is
problematic. This becomes especially true in developing countries
where the need to maximize wealth is most pressing.
The third characteristic I will call "investor substitution."
Assume, for purposes of this theory, that the companies from
diverse jurisdictions are interchangeable-that companies from
the United States, Germany, and China are equally capable of
providing the given good or service. This is of course not true in
all industries; highly technologically sophisticated sectors, for
example, will tend to favor companies from more developed
countries. But the gap is narrowing as developing countries like
China progress, and the gap does not exist at all for many or
most industries. Further assume that the host country's need for
FDI is constant, such that if companies originating from one
jurisdiction are disinclined to do business in the manner
expected by the host country, that host country will seek the
investment from other jurisdictions. Given these assumptions,
quasi-criminalization and the discretionary investment forum
will result in investor substitution. Companies from a country
that enforces a given criminal prohibition-again, think of the
United States enforcing a bribery prohibition-may find the risk
(say, of paying bribes in Nigeria) too high. Those companies may
choose not to invest in countries like Nigeria (as ample empirical
evidence demonstrates). 33 The host country, which remains in
need of the FDI, will seek it from companies that are from
jurisdictions that do not enforce the prohibition. Because these
companies can provide roughly the same good or service-in
other words, the substitution costs to the host country are
negligible-they will become substitute foreign investors.
This analysis is related to, but significantly different from,
the previous work on substitution. That body of scholarship, as
noted above, has focused on a given actor substituting criminal
acts Y and Z for criminal act X. It assumed a given set of actors,
choosing among alternative forms of criminality. The principle of
investor substitution is quite different. It assumes alternative
actors are all deciding whether to engage in the same form of
criminality (or, to be clear, conduct that one jurisdiction deems
criminal, though others do not). It is a variation on the

33 For a summary of the empirical literature, see Andrew Brady Spalding,
Corruption, Corporations, and the New Human Right, 89 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan.
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232670.
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substitution thesis that applies uniquely to the realm of
extraterritorial enforcement.
The Net Impact on Crime: An Illustration
The impact of investor substitution on the net levels of crime
in the host country will depend on the level of enforcement. This
section illustrates how a relatively low level of enforcement can
reduce overall crime, but increases in enforcement will,
ironically, increase levels of criminality. This model uses antibribery law to illustrate this dynamic.
This paper does not assume the existence of a perfectly
rational enforcement authority. Rather than exploring what a
hypothetical authority should do, it explores the implications of
what actual governments would do or have done. It posits a
number of conditions that closely resemble the actual world of
anti-bribery enforcement, and which would likely be typical of
other areas of extraterritorial white-collar criminal enforcement
as well. Such an enforcement authority is, predictably,
economically subrational in several important respects.
First, the enforcement authority assumes that the optimal
level of bribery is zero, and does not engage in sophisticated
arguments about whether some amount of bribery may actually
be efficient. This assumption holds true both for bribery among
companies subject to its jurisdiction, and for overall levels of
bribery in the host countries as well. Alternatively, one might
assume that the enforcement authority is guided by a
deontological argument-that bribery is inherently wrongrather than an assumption about the relationship between
bribery and economic efficiency. Either way, the authority is
determined to reduce bribery as far as possible.
Second, and relatedly, the agencies of the enforcement
authority that enforce the bribery prohibition will actually take
measures to deter bribery without regard for their impact on
economic efficiency. Whatever they may have assumed about the
relationship between bribery and efficiency, the statute charges
the agencies with reducing bribery and makes no mention of its
economic implications.
Third, the enforcement authority is unwilling or unable to
impose a combination of enforcement expenditures and level of
penalty that would immediately reduce bribery to zero. It is faced
with limited enforcement resources, uncertain political support,
and imperfect empirical knowledge about the effects of
enforcement on crime. Similarly, it likely subscribes to notions of
fairness that will prevent it from imposing the exorbitant

B.

2014]

Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial White-Collar Crime

365

penalties that could deter bribery where the probability of
detection was more limited. Thus constrained, the enforcement
authority experiments with varying levels of enforcement over
time (which is precisely what has occurred in the United
States).34 Accordingly, the illustration below posits a recognizably
subrational enforcement authority, and uses law and economics
principles to trace out the implications of that authority's
enforcement decisions.
Assume, then, a developing country (the "host country") that
solicits foreign direct investment in its infrastructure sector. In
this country and sector, bribery is quite common. Further assume
that companies from two jurisdictions-Jurisdiction A and
Jurisdiction B-have historically invested in this sector.35 All
firms competing in the host country's infrastructure sector are
from one of these jurisdictions; no companies from jurisdictions
other than A or B are investing there.
The host country will regularly issue Requests For Proposals
(RFPs) and companies will submit bids in an effort to win
contracts. Each contract involves a variety of transactions in
which bribes would typically be paid: some would be paid during
the bidding process (preparing and submitting the bid, then
winning the contract) and others would be paid in the course of
performing the contract (visas, permits, inspections, etc.).
Further assume that the number of transactions per contract is
fixed, resulting in a fixed number of total transactions. For
purposes of this argument, assume that 100% of all business
transactions in the host country government have involved
bribes.
At a time that we shall call Time 1, neither Jurisdiction A
nor Jurisdiction B is enforcing an extraterritorial bribery
prohibition. Firms from both A and B therefore pay bribes freely.
But Jurisdiction A firms are more efficient than Jurisdiction B
firms, such that A firms in Time 1 win 60% of the contracts and
B firms win 40%. The chart below captures these numbers.

34
35

Id. at 7-10.
I use "jurisdiction" rather than "country" because often the jurisdiction of a given

country will extend to companies from other countries as well. For example, certain
foreign companies are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. extraterritorial anti-bribery
statute, such that even though they do not reside in the United States, they are
nevertheless "from" the U.S. jurisdiction. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/guide.pdf.
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Enforcement
Level

% Market
Share for Firms
from
Jurisdiction A

% Bribes that

A Firms Pay
in Their
Transactions

Overall Rate
of Bribery in
Host
Country

None

60

100

100

Firms from Jurisdiction A win 60% of the contracts, but pay
bribes in 100% of the transactions. Jurisdiction B firms thus
have a 40% market share, and likewise bribe 100% of the time.
The overall rate of bribery in the infrastructure sector of the host
country is therefore 100% in Time 1.
However, at Time 2, Jurisdiction A announces that it will
begin enforcing an extraterritorial criminal bribery prohibition.
The enforcement agencies are, again, subrational actors, so they
are unable to implement an enforcement regime that would
reduce bribery to zero: they cannot dedicate the resources
necessary to raise the probability of detection to the requisite
level, and fairness principles do not allow them to impose
exorbitant penalties that would compensate for the low level of
detection. Constrained as they are by limited resources and by
fairness, they commence what we will call a low level of
enforcement. Jurisdiction B does not follow suit and does not
implement any kind of extraterritorial bribery prohibition, so B
firms continue to bribe freely.
The host country issues a new set of RFPs and awards all
available contracts to firms from Jurisdictions A and B.
Jurisdiction A firms now become what we will call reluctant bribe
payers. They do not stop paying bribes altogether, but they begin
searching for ways to avoid paying bribes where possible while
remaining present in the sector and profitable. While they may
have previously paid a small bribe to expedite a visa approval,
they are now willing to wait; instead of paying a bribe to send
their goods immediately through customs, their ships wait in line
for days in the harbor. Similarly, the government of Jurisdiction
A begins working on behalf of its companies to reduce the
demand for bribery in the host country (as the U.S. and UK
governments do today).
The reluctant bribe payers (companies from Jurisdiction A)
recognize that avoiding bribes will often reduce their efficiencywaiting in the harbor for customs approval is not without cost to
the company. But they are willing to absorb these costs to reduce
the risk of penalty for violating the prohibition. Although the risk
of penalty is high enough to deter a certain amount of bribery, it
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is not high enough to completely stop paying bribes. For
reluctant bribe payers, the benefits of continuing to invest in the
host country remain high enough that the company can pay some
bribes and accept the risk that it will be caught and penalized for
violating the bribery prohibition.
In the course of continuing to do business in the host
country, the reluctant bribe payer will therefore encounter three
kinds of transactions. The first is where the risk of detection is
sufficiently high (or the firm is sufficiently principled) that it
refuses to pay the bribe but can still find ways to complete the
transaction. These may entail increased costs for the firm (such
as waiting in line at port) but owing to the firm's efficiency (or
the less than perfectly competitive market conditions) the firm
can absorb these costs while remaining profitable. Alternatively,
the firm may seek the diplomatic assistance of the governments
(in the United States, these would be the Departments of
Commerce or State). This is the kind of conduct that anti-bribery
advocates seek to incentivize and may generally assume occurs.
However, the firm will encounter a second kind of bribe, in which
it will likewise refuse to pay but cannot complete the transaction
without it. The firm must therefore knowingly forego the
transaction; the best example would be a lost bid in a RFP. For
the third kind of bribe, the risk of detection may be sufficiently
low, or the costs of foregoing the transaction are sufficiently high
(the company really needs this particular bid, or cannot afford to
wait three days in port) that the firm will pay the bribe and
accept the risk of detection.36
Given the three types of bribes the firm will encounter and
Jurisdiction A's new but still low-level of enforcement, assume
that A firms reduce their bribery by half. They are now willing to
pay bribes in 50% of all transactions. Assume further that as a
result, the percentage of contracts they will be able to win also
drops by half, from 60% of all contracts to 30% of all contracts.
Investor substitution occurs, and B firms win the extra 30% of
the contracts. Now A firms have 30% of the market and B firms
have 70%. Owing to the downside of deterrence's upside, B firms
36 The ability of companies from Jurisdiction A to absorb a degree of lost profits but
remain competitive assumes that the market is not what economists would consider
perfectly competitive. Were it so, the companies would have no margin to absorb the
losses because competitors would have already been selling at the lower cost. But foreign
direct investment is not perfectly competitive, in at least two respects. First, often a sort
of oligopoly exists where only select companies from select countries are positioned to
compete. Second, some companies might have a competitive advantage by virtue of their
access to capital, technological, or various forms of government support. Accordingly, this
illustration assumes that Jurisdiction A firms are operating at a level of profitability that
permits them to absorb limited losses to comply with the statute.
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continue to bribe in 100% of all their transactions, and therefore
will bribe on the extra 30% of the contracts they will win. But
because A firms were paying bribes on those contracts in Time 1,
investor substitution has not resulted in a net increase in bribery
in the host country.
Rather, A's low level of enforcement has thus succeeded in
two respects. Of the 30% of the contracts that A firms win, they
will only pay bribes in 50% of these transactions. For half of this
30%, or 15%, no bribes are being paid; this portion of the host
country's infrastructure sector is now clean. Jurisdiction A's
enforcement has thus reduced bribery among its own firms by
50%, and has reduced net bribery levels in the host country by
15%.
Enforcement
Level

% Market
Share for Firms
from
Jurisdiction A

% Bribes that

A Firms Pay
in Their
Transactions

Overall Rate
of Bribery in
Host
Country

Tl

None

60

100

100

T2

Low

30

50

85

Time

Again, overall levels of bribery have gone down from 100% to
85% because A firms have a 30% market share and are not
paying bribes on half of the related transactions. This is the
outcome that anti-bribery advocates take for granted, and for
those who accept the normative premise that federal law should
deter overseas bribery, it is the reason to continue enforcement.
But now assume a subsequent point in time, called Time 3.
The enforcement authorities in Jurisdiction A, perhaps
encouraged from the successes of Time 2, have decided to ramp
up enforcement through the dedication of new resources. We will
call this mid-level enforcement, and it significantly increases the
likelihood of detecting violations. In Time 3, the host country
issues a new set of RFPs. The other assumptions still hold: the
total number of transactions is again fixed, companies from
Jurisdictions A and B will again compete, and companies from
Jurisdiction B still bribe without fear of punishment.
Companies from Jurisdiction A now engage in a new
cost-benefit analysis. They conclude that because the risk of
detection and therefore penalty is higher, they must pay even
fewer bribes than they did in Time 2. Say that mid-level
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enforcement induces A firms to reduce their bribery percentage
from 50% to 25% of all transactions.
The mid-level enforcement regime has thus succeeded in
reducing bribery among companies subject to its jurisdiction. But
consider the impact that investor substitution will now have on
the change in overall bribery levels from Time 2 to Time 3.
Although A firms won 60% of all contracts when bribing 100% of
the time, they can now win only one-fourth of those contracts.37
They now have only a 15% market share, down from 30% in Time
2. The 15% market share that A firms have lost since Time 2 will
now go to B firms, which continue to bribe 100% of the time. In
other words, 15% of the transactions have shifted from reluctant
bribe payers to free bribe payers. Jurisdiction A firms remain
engaged in only 15% of all transactions in the host country's
infrastructure sector, and they will pay bribes in one-fourth of
that 15%. Accordingly, A firms are bribe-free in 11% of all
transactions. Because all other transactions are paid with bribes,
the overall bribery level in the host country is now at 89%.
Enforcement
Level

% Market
Share for Firms
from
Jurisdiction A

% Bribes that

A Firms Pay
in Their
Transactions

Overall Rate
of Bribery in
Host
Country

Tl

None

60

100

100

T2

Low

30

50

85

T3

Mid

15

25

89

Time

From Time 2, overall bribery has increased by 4%, and the
increase is entirely due to Jurisdiction A's increased enforcement
effort.
Consider a further period in time, Time 4, in which
Jurisdiction A has finally resolved to dedicate the enforcement
resources necessary to achieve what it deems the optimal rate of
bribery among its firms-0%. And suppose it succeeds, such that
now A firms pay absolutely no bribes. Further assume that all
other conditions remain the same, and the host country issues a
new set of RFPs. Jurisdiction A firms can no longer win contracts

37 This exercise assumes that the percentage of contracts it can win will drop
precisely in the same amount as the percentage of bribes it can pay. In practice, the
relationship between these two figures would be more complicated.
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in this host country's infrastructure sector. Jurisdiction B firms
now win 100% of the contracts, engage in 100% of the
transactions, and pay bribes 100% of the time. While the rate of
bribery among A firms is now 0%, the overall rate of bribery in
the host country is 100%.
Enforcement
Level

% Market
Share for Firms
from
Jurisdiction A

% Bribes that

A Firms Pay
in Their
Transactions

Overall Rate
of Bribery in
Host
Country

Tl

None

60

100

100

T2

Low

30

50

85

T3

Mid

15

25

89

T4

High

0

0

100

Time

Notice the pattern. At Time 2, its efforts to deter bribery
were effective in reducing the overall level of bribery in the host
country. The success was due to raising the risk of detection and
penalty to the point that its companies would make an effort to
bribe less, but could still do business. Companies from
Jurisdiction A indeed lost business as a result of the decision to
enforce the bribery prohibition. But in Time 1, companies from
Jurisdiction A were bribing as freely as companies from
Jurisdiction B, so losing business to companies from Jurisdiction
B at Time 2 did not result in an increase in bribery for the host
country. The enforcement authority from Jurisdiction A thus
continues to believe that increasing enforcement will decrease
bribery. But at Time 3, the second increase in enforcement has
reduced bribery only among companies subject to A's jurisdiction.
Those companies are indeed bribing less. But owing to investor
substitution, the impact on overall levels of bribery in the host
country is a net increase. And we saw at Time 4 that raising
penalty risks further can produce a scenario in which the rates of
bribery in the host country return to 100%, a level not seen since
before the enforcement effort began. In sum, after Time 1, the
overall rate of bribery in the host country correlates inversely
with Jurisdiction A's enforcement. Likewise, it correlates
inversely with the percentage of bribes that A firms are paying.
As Jurisdiction A attempts, and succeeds, in decreasing bribery
among its own companies, it increases overall bribery in the
developing country.
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This illustration is of course artificially simplified. In reality,
a number of additional variables would influence the net impact
of increased enforcement: the number of transactions, the
number of agencies or persons soliciting bribes, changes in the
level of penalty, changes in the effectiveness of the reluctant
bribe payer's tools for avoiding bribes, and perhaps most
importantly, a decrease in the percentage of transactions in
developing countries that require bribes. Developing a model that
considers each of these variables is a project for another day. But
this thought experiment nevertheless illustrates limitations
inherent in the effort to deter extraterritorial white-collar crime,
given current global economic and legal conditions.
C.

Deterrence's Double Disutility
Though the enforcement authority's aim is to maximize
utility, extraterritorial white-collar deterrence will tend to
produce two distinct forms of disutility.
The first is, quite simply, that it often will not work. As
explained above, overseas business environments will often lead
to an increase, rather than a decrease, in the conduct we seek to
deter. This will be true as long as capital-exporting jurisdictions
vary in their enactment and enforcement of criminal
prohibitions. The answer, one might think, is to tinker with the
variables available to the enforcement authority: enforcement
expenditures, fine levels, the length of imprisonment, and the
standard for imposing liability. The problem, however, is that
once into Time 2, decreasing the cost of the penalty through any
of these four variables will necessarily decrease the disincentive
to engage in the act: reducing enforcement expenditures, fines, or
prison terms, or raising the standard for imposing liability, will
decrease the costs of crime and increase its frequency.
In Times 2 and 3, the enforcement authority is trapped. By
not increasing the risk of detection, it tolerates a measure of
criminality among persons subject to its jurisdiction. But by
raising the risk of detection, it produces the concurrent decrease
in criminality among its companies, and an increase in that same
behavior in the host country among all actors. These are the
Scylla and Charybdis of extraterritorial white-collar criminal
enforcement. The enforcement authority must choose between
the harm of knowingly tolerating preventable criminality among
its own companies, and knowingly increasing levels of criminality
in vulnerable developing countries. It cannot avoid both.
But even if the first problem were resolved, and overseas
deterrence efforts were to effectively reduce crime, the law and
economics enforcement authority would be left with a second
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problem. Consider again the assumption behind the economic
theory of public enforcement: the taxpayer is the potential victim,
and she pays taxes to prevent her victimization. That works in
domestic enforcement, where all potential victims are taxpayers
and all taxpayers are potential victims. But what if the victims
are not taxpayers, and the taxpayers are not victims? What if the
victims lie beyond the jurisdiction that is enforcing the criminal
prohibition, and are therefore not paying the taxes that fund
enforcement? Again using the anti-bribery example, we devote
substantial public resources to protecting those overseas victims
through the DOJ, SEC, FBI, offices in Commerce and State, and
the federal judiciary. And various economic benefits might very
well accrue to U.S. taxpayers, including the improvement of
overseas markets and the resulting potential for economic and
political alliances. But stakeholders to anti-bribery enforcement
generally agree that the principal victims of extraterritorial
bribery are the citizens of the overseas governments. And they
are not paying for enforcement. That is, Congress enacted a
statute in which U.S. taxpayers would pay to protect
non-taxpayers from the harms of bribery. To the
utility-maximizing taxpayer typically associated with law and
economics, this is the second disutility of deterrence.
The enforcement authority thus seeks the Golden Mean or, if
one prefers, the Goldilocks theory, of enforcement: to enforce its
prohibition only to the point that it deters overall levels of
bribery, and not further. The law and economics enforcement
authority is trapped in this dilemma, unable to achieve what it
considers the optimal level of criminality among its own actors
without raising levels of the same conduct in the host country.
To the extent that the extraterritorial prohibition seeks both
to deter criminality among the jurisdiction's own actors and to
reduce overall levels of crime, the traditional mechanisms of
deterrence may not be the most effective tools available. That is,
the means typically employed by deterrence advocates may not
be best suited to achieve deterrence's goals. Rather, the
achievement of deterrence goals may reqmre usmg
non-deterrence, or extra-deterrence, means.
As the above illustration shows, extraterritorial crime
reduction requires reaching two sets of actors who lie beyond the
reach of the enforcement authority. The first is the host country:
to the extent that a capital-importing country can enforce its own
prohibitions (on bribery, for instance) no investor substitution
can occur. All companies investing in that country would (in
theory) be subject to the same risks and costs, and would engage
in crime at roughly similar levels. If the host country sought to
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reduce a given form of conduct to zero, it could do so, and
differences among the capital-exporting jurisdictions would
become irrelevant. But a developing country, almost by
definition, is ill-equipped to do so; its state is not yet sufficiently
resourced to deter the conduct of powerful foreign firms. This is
thus a long-term project. Accordingly, the capital-exporting
jurisdiction seeking to deter destructive conduct in foreign
countries can also seek to influence the behavior of competing
capital-exporting jurisdictions that do not enforce comparable
prohibitions (the B Jurisdictions). The problem, of course, is that
the enforcing jurisdictions (the A Jurisdictions) generally have no
authority over either the capital-importing or capital-exporting
governments.
Ill. RETHINKING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The challenge of extraterritorial crime reduction is to
promote better overseas conduct using tools other than, or in
addition to, the coercive power of the state. The above illustration
shows how mere compliance by firms subject to an enforcing
jurisdiction will tend to create an environment in which those
firms cannot compete: eventually, high levels of enforcement
combined with investor substitution will chase them out of the
market. From the company's own standpoint, then, compliance
proves self-defeating. But where the risk of detection is
sufficiently high, noncompliance is not the remedy; this too will
prove self-defeating. The remedy lies in doing that which law
does not, and perhaps could not, require: firms subject to such
extraterritorial prohibitions must seek to change the behavior of
competitor firms, and push for reforms in capital-importing
governments.
Enter corporate social responsibility, which generally
encourages firms to engage in socially beneficial conduct beyond
the minimal requirements of compliance.3s This is especially true
in the face of globalization, where "the capacity of the state to
regulate economic behavior and to set the conditions for market
exchange is in decline." 39 CSR scholars have argued that
globalization requires corporations to "go beyond what is

38 Given the mind-boggling array of proffered definitions of CSR, this article
attempts none. For a sample, see Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility
Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW

CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9, 9

(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007).
39 Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Globalization and Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 413,
426 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
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required by law, when the legal system is imperfect or legal rules
are incomplete."4o
But the CSR literature "has only begun to discuss the
consequences of globalization," 41 and has yet to tackle the
difficult problems of extraterritorial deterrence given the reality
of selective criminalization and investor substitution. While some
scholars have suggested that "creative compliance" is the "most
intractable" of "obstacles to effective legal control of business,"42
the above deterrence analysis shows that the problem of
corporate misbehavior is far greater than merely ensuring that
firms obey the law to which they are subject. Jurisdiction A may
draft a perfect statute, utterly devoid of loopholes and sufficiently
expansive to include all conceivable forms of socially destructive
behavior, and yet still fail to deter. Indeed, it may actually cause
an increase in the proscribed conduct. CSR, accordingly, must do
more than encourage firms to fully comply with the law in both
its letter and "spirit." It must provide firms with a paradigm that
induces them to systematically work toward altering the conduct
of actors other than themselves. It is an other-regarding form of
CSR that focuses not on the victims, but on potential wrongdoers
whose home jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to deter
destructive behavior. It must further persuade firms that the
socially responsible thing is closely aligned with their interests
and motivations.
The existing literature on CSR and globalization has not
provided this paradigm. That literature has generally envisioned
any or all of three forms of socially responsible corporate conduct
with respect to developing countries. The first appeals to the
firm's profit motive. It argues that various forms of socially
beneficial conduct, while not immediately profitable, will tend to
prove profitable in the long term. Indeed, it may have become
"conventional wisdom for management texts and CSR advocates"
to claim that considering "a broad range of stakeholders is in a
firm's best long-term interests."43 This is sometimes called the
''business case" for CSR, holding that companies can "do well by

Id. at 414.
Id. at 422.
42 See McBarnet, supra note 38, at 48.
43 David L. Levy & Rami Kaplan, Corporate Social Responsibility and Theories of
Global Governance: Strategic Contestation in Global Issue Arenas, in THE OXFORD
40
41

HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 433, 435 (Andrew Crane et al. eds.,
2008) (citing ANNE T. LAWRENCE & JAMES WEBER, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY:
STAKEHOLDERS, ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY 21 (13th ed. 2004)).
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doing good."44 The business case hypothesis has been subject to
rigorous empirical tests over the years, but the results have
proven unpersuasive.45 Some have thus concluded that "a solid
business case cannot be built by depending solely on locating an
irrefutably established causal connection" between CSR and
financial performance. 46 The link is simply too remote and
tenuous.
Accordingly, other forms of CSR in the globalization context
appeal to other corporate motives and modes of operation. The
second form of CSR is philanthropy, whereby the firm functions
as a charitable donor. In developing countries, CSR frequently
takes the form of investment in education, health, the
environment, or other community services. 47 While a firm may
well have mixed motives in its charitable undertakings, this form
of CSR seeks to move beyond the short-term profit motive in
encouraging socially responsible behavior.
Yet a third form of CSR frames the corporation not as a
self-interested profit seeker but as a citizen, as a responsible
contributing member of the polity. It holds that particularly in
developing countries, where the host state is less effective and
the regime of transnational rules is "fragile and incomplete,"
firms have a "political responsibility to contribute to the
development and proper working of global governance."48 These
scholars argue that corporations must become "politicized"
through an "enlarged understanding of responsibility" to "solve
political problems in cooperation with state actors and civil
society actors." 49 They should adopt more "cosmopolitan or
higher-order interests."5o These scholars envision CSR as part of
a process in which "political solutions for societal challenges are
no longer limited to the political system but have become
44 Elizabeth C. Kurucz, Barry A. Colbert & David Wheeler, The Business Case for
Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY 83, 84 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
45 See, e.g., Philip L. Cochran & Robert A. Wood, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Financial Performance, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 42, 42-56 (1984); Samuel B. Graves &
Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional Owners and Corporate Social Performance, 37 ACAD. OF
MGMT. J. 1034, 1042-44 (1994); James E. Mattingly & Shawn L. Berman, Measurement of

Corporate Social Action: Discovering Taxonomy in the Kinder Lydenburg Domini Ratings
Data, 45 Bus. & Soc'y 20, 40-42 (2006).
46 Kurucz et al., supra note 44, at 85.
47 Wayne Visser, Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 473, 493 (Andrew Crane et al.
eds., 2008).
48 Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 39, at 414.
49 Id. at 426.
50 Id. at 427 (citing Hildy Teegan, Jonathan P. Doh & Sushi! Vachani, The

Importance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance and Value,
35 J. OF INT'L Bus. STUD. 463, 4 71 (2004)).
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embedded in decentralized processes that include non-state
actors such as NGOs and corporations."51 Ultimately, by this
view, corporations must be understood as both "economic and
political actors."52
Note the relationship here between economic and political
action. This model expressly makes a distinction between the
conventional economic motives of a multinational corporation,
and the "higher-order" political motives. This form of CSR asks
firms to transcend profit seeking in the name of citizenship. It
posits a sharp dichotomy between the firm's short-term economic
interests and society's longer-term interests.53
Notably, so too does the charity model rest on this
distinction. It calls upon firms to build social infrastructure
through donations that, with the possible exception of tax
benefits, are generally a chink to the bottom line. Finally, notice
that even the so-called business case concedes the tension
between foreseeable profits and socially responsible conduct. It
has historically built its case not on foreseeable profits, but on
long-term profit, and asked (or hoped) that the empiricists could
prove the connection. This empirical proof was sought, of course,
because the connection between CSR and profit was not
immediately apparent. Like the charity and political actor
models, the business case asks the firm to set aside short-term
interests in the name of a longer-term-and, it seems, elusivefinancial benefit.
But this distinction-between short-term economic interests
and long-term social interests-is precisely the reason that so
many doubt whether CSR can ever do much work. To the extent
that corporations are asked to suspend or compromise their
pursuit of profits, we wonder whether CSR's impact will expand
beyond the fringes. CSR's prospects would indeed be far greater
in a set of legal and economic conditions that made the
connection between socially beneficial conduct and immediate
profits more apparent.
Those circumstances now exist in the arena of foreign direct
investment in developing countries. The above analysis has
shown that only up to a point will developed countries' efforts to
reduce overall levels of extraterritorial crime actually work.
Given the unique conditions of selective criminality and investor
substitution, strict compliance with an ever-increasmg
Id. at 427.
Id.
53 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 707 (2002).
51

52
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enforcement effort poses an immediate threat to the profitability
of companies from enforcing jurisdictions. Companies from
non-enforcing jurisdictions will eventually chase them out of the
market. Companies will see--and indeed, in the bribery space
they increasingly report54-that enforcement and compliance
significantly compromise their profitability.
In this space arises the need for a new kind of CSR. Like the
third model above, it would call on corporations to work toward
political reforms in the countries in which they do business. It
would indeed ask them to assume the role of a responsible
citizen, and help to ensure that not just they, but others as well,
are subject to meaningful laws that are effectively enforced. It
would help to create the conditions that give rise to a
broad-based culture of compliance. But in acting as citizen, this
form of CSR would not ask the corporation to suspend its pursuit
of profit, even of foreseeable and relatively short-term profit. It
would not ask firms to alternately wear either of two hats-one
as profit-seeker, the other as responsible citizen. It would
collapse the dichotomies that are so pervasive in CSR
literature-between private and public, between profit and
charity, between the demands of business and the aspirations of
politics.
Corporations might engage in any number of such activities
in developing countries. They might finance studies on the causes
of particular forms of criminal conduct and develop innovative
solutions. They might lobby for reforms in the host country that
would increase, rather than decrease, enforcement. So too might
they lobby their own jurisdiction to use the levers of
international diplomacy to force other capital-exporting
jurisdictions to enforce their extraterritorial prohibitions. All of
these can be justified by a CSR model that recognizes
corporations as responsible citizens. And all can be justified by
an appeal to immediate profitability. A compliant U.S.-based
multinational corporation doing business in Nigeria does not
need a host of empirical studies to understand that if Nigeria
enforced its own domestic bribery prohibitions, or China enforced
its extraterritorial prohibition, the U.S. company would become
more profitable.
CSR is typically understood as a critique, either explicit or
implicit, of neoclassical economics. It has sought to move beyond
the Friedmanesque view of the firm, which has "one and only one
social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage

54

See Spalding, supra note 33, at 10--15.

Chapman Law Review

378

[Vol. 17:2

in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game." 55 So too has the bulk of CSR
literature asked firms to move beyond the motives typically
attributed to the homo economicus of law and economics. Though
it may well remain true that business engagement with social
issues is "generally attributed to two broad motivations, financial
and political-institutional," 56 these need not be mutually
exclusive. To the extent that the CSR literature can collapse this
dichotomy, it will do far more to command the attention of the
corporations whose voluntary conduct the advocates wish to
direct. And contemporary international business, where
companies from diverse jurisdictions are competing in developing
countries for business, now provides the catalyst.
CONCLUSION

The above model has shown how efforts to decrease overseas
bribery may very well have the opposite result and increase
levels of criminality. It has used bribery precisely because it is
perhaps the best example today of U.S. law pursuing overseas
deterrence. But the model would apply to any area of law in
which overall deterrence was the policy goal but where global
legal and economic conditions give rise to investor substitution.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has recently taken measures to
restrict the extraterritorial application of federal law governing
corporate conduct, 57 the trajectory of increasing globalization
would suggest that efforts to regulate extraterritorial business
conduct will tend to expand rather than retract. Should this
happen, regulators and advocates alike will increasingly contend
with these unique conditions.
Ultimately, the deterrence theory of law and economics
identifies a problem that it cannot solve. It must hand off the
problem to another literature, with a different set of assumptions
and goals, in the hopes that it may fashion a new remedy. CSR
may very well be that literature. This essay calls upon it to move
beyond the dichotomies that have simultaneously made CSR
scholarship seem so inspiring to some and yet so futile to others.
Indeed, applied to contemporary international business, CSR's

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
Levy & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 435.
See Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887-88 (2010)
(restricting the application of Rule lOb-5 to domestic transactions); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (restricting the application of the Alien Tort
Statute to conduct that "touch[es] and concern[s] the territory of the United
States ... with sufficient force.").
55
56
57
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goal may very well be to collapse the dichotomy between law and
economics and CSR itself.

